Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty

A Differential Games Approach

Jacob Engwerda, D. Mahmoudinia, Rahim Dalali Isfahani

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Today, debt stabilization in an uncertain environment is an important issue. In particular, the question how fiscal and monetary authorities should deal with this uncertainty is very important. Especially for some developing countries such as Iran, in which on average 60 percent of government revenues comes from oil, and consequently uncertainty about oil prices has a large effect on budget planning, this is an important question. For this reason, we extend in this paper the well-known debt stabilization game introduced by Tabellini (1986). We incorporate deterministic noise into that framework. We solve this extended game under a Non-cooperative, Cooperative and Stackelberg setting assuming a feedback information structure. The main result shows that under all three
regimes, more active policies are used to track debt to its equilibrium level and this equilibrium level becomes smaller, the more fiscal and monetary authorities are concerned about noise. Furthermore, the best-response policy configuration if policymakers are confronted with uncertainty seems to depend on the level of anticipated uncertainty.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages28
Volume2016-012
Publication statusPublished - 31 Mar 2016

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2016-012

Fingerprint

Uncertainty
Central bank
Differential games
Government
Interaction
Debt
Fiscal
Authority
Stabilization
Stackelberg
Oil prices
Developing countries
Politicians
Best response
Government revenue
Iran
Information structure
Oil
Planning

Keywords

  • fiscal and monetary policy interaction
  • differential game
  • dynamic system
  • uncertainty

Cite this

Engwerda, J., Mahmoudinia, D., & Isfahani, R. D. (2016). Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty: A Differential Games Approach. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2016-012). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Engwerda, Jacob ; Mahmoudinia, D. ; Isfahani, Rahim Dalali. / Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty : A Differential Games Approach. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2016. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Engwerda, J, Mahmoudinia, D & Isfahani, RD 2016 'Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty: A Differential Games Approach' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2016-012, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty : A Differential Games Approach. / Engwerda, Jacob; Mahmoudinia, D.; Isfahani, Rahim Dalali.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2016. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2016-012).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty

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AB - Today, debt stabilization in an uncertain environment is an important issue. In particular, the question how fiscal and monetary authorities should deal with this uncertainty is very important. Especially for some developing countries such as Iran, in which on average 60 percent of government revenues comes from oil, and consequently uncertainty about oil prices has a large effect on budget planning, this is an important question. For this reason, we extend in this paper the well-known debt stabilization game introduced by Tabellini (1986). We incorporate deterministic noise into that framework. We solve this extended game under a Non-cooperative, Cooperative and Stackelberg setting assuming a feedback information structure. The main result shows that under all threeregimes, more active policies are used to track debt to its equilibrium level and this equilibrium level becomes smaller, the more fiscal and monetary authorities are concerned about noise. Furthermore, the best-response policy configuration if policymakers are confronted with uncertainty seems to depend on the level of anticipated uncertainty.

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Engwerda J, Mahmoudinia D, Isfahani RD. Government and Central Bank Interaction under uncertainty: A Differential Games Approach. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2016 Mar 31. (CentER Discussion Paper).