Hawks and Doves at the FOMC

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Abstract

In this paper we estimate ideal points of Bank Presidents and Board Governors at the FOMC. We use stated preferences from FOMC transcripts and estimate a hierarchical spatial voting model. We find a clear difference between the average Board Governor and Bank President. We find little evidence for difference in ideal points according to the appointing president in case of Bank Governors.
Similarly career background has no clear effect on the ideal points. We find that the median ideal point at the FOMC has been fairly stable over our sample period (1989-2007) emphasizing the lack of a political appointment channel. We also show that there was considerable variation in the median ideal point of Bank Presidents and Board Governors, but that these seem to cancel each other out. Also the dispersion of opinions (the spread between the lowest and highest ideal point) varies over time, suggestion variation in agreement at the FOMC.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Number of pages25
Volume2015-013
Publication statusPublished - 26 Feb 2015

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2015-013

Fingerprint

Median
Time variation
Spatial voting
Voting model
Stated preference

Keywords

  • central banks
  • committees
  • transcripts
  • ideal points
  • FOMC

Cite this

Eijffinger, S. C. W., Mahieu, R. J., & Raes, L. B. D. (2015). Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2015-013). Tilburg: Economics.
Eijffinger, S.C.W. ; Mahieu, R.J. ; Raes, L.B.D. / Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. Tilburg : Economics, 2015. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Eijffinger, SCW, Mahieu, RJ & Raes, LBD 2015 'Hawks and Doves at the FOMC' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2015-013, Economics, Tilburg.

Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. / Eijffinger, S.C.W.; Mahieu, R.J.; Raes, L.B.D.

Tilburg : Economics, 2015. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2015-013).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - In this paper we estimate ideal points of Bank Presidents and Board Governors at the FOMC. We use stated preferences from FOMC transcripts and estimate a hierarchical spatial voting model. We find a clear difference between the average Board Governor and Bank President. We find little evidence for difference in ideal points according to the appointing president in case of Bank Governors.Similarly career background has no clear effect on the ideal points. We find that the median ideal point at the FOMC has been fairly stable over our sample period (1989-2007) emphasizing the lack of a political appointment channel. We also show that there was considerable variation in the median ideal point of Bank Presidents and Board Governors, but that these seem to cancel each other out. Also the dispersion of opinions (the spread between the lowest and highest ideal point) varies over time, suggestion variation in agreement at the FOMC.

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KW - committees

KW - transcripts

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Eijffinger SCW, Mahieu RJ, Raes LBD. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. Tilburg: Economics. 2015 Feb 26. (CentER Discussion Paper).