Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs

J. Boone, C. Schottmuller

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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Abstract

We provide a modeling framework to think about selective contracting in the health care sector. Two health care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power tends to lower quality and lead to inefficiency. In a dynamic extension of the model, providers under-invest in quality while there can be both over and under-investment in cost reductions if there is a monopoly insurer while an efficient investment equilibrium exists with insurer competition.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherTILEC
Number of pages38
Volume2015-003
Publication statusPublished - 12 Jan 2015

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2015-003

Fingerprint

Health
Costs
Insurer
Contracting
Market power
Monopoly
Healthcare
Quality costs
Health care providers
Health insurance
Overinvestment
Inefficiency
Underinvestment
Modeling

Keywords

  • selective contracting
  • exclusive contracts, common
  • common contracts
  • managed care
  • health care quality
  • signaling

Cite this

Boone, J., & Schottmuller, C. (2015). Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2015-003). Tilburg: TILEC.
Boone, J. ; Schottmuller, C. / Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs. Tilburg : TILEC, 2015. (TILEC Discussion Paper).
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Boone, J & Schottmuller, C 2015 'Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2015-003, TILEC, Tilburg.

Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs. / Boone, J.; Schottmuller, C.

Tilburg : TILEC, 2015. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2015-003).

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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Boone J, Schottmuller C. Health Provider Networks, Quality and Costs. Tilburg: TILEC. 2015 Jan 12. (TILEC Discussion Paper).

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