Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production.Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation.Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenuesharing team members have an incentive to free-ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output.We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free-riding.As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages32
Volume2005-109
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2005-109

Fingerprint

Opportunism
Incentives
Revenue sharing
Team leaders
Temptation
Experiment
Free-riding
Team production
Team performance

Keywords

  • team production
  • leadership
  • opportunism
  • experiments

Cite this

Potters, J. J. M., Sefton, M., & van der Heijden, E. C. M. (2005). Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-109). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Potters, J.J.M. ; Sefton, M. ; van der Heijden, E.C.M. / Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Potters, JJM, Sefton, M & van der Heijden, ECM 2005 'Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2005-109, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams. / Potters, J.J.M.; Sefton, M.; van der Heijden, E.C.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-109).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams

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Potters JJM, Sefton M, van der Heijden ECM. Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2005. (CentER Discussion Paper).