How Does the Governance of Academic Faculties Affect Competition Among Them?

J. Prüfer, U. Walz

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We analyze competition among academic faculties for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. When competing for new members, existing members trade off the effect of entry on average status of the faculty against the reduction in teaching load that can be bought if no entry takes place and the entrant's wage is saved. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lower-ranking candidates. Endogenizing the governance structure of the faculties, we show that the aggregate surplus of a faculty is maximized if a decision-making rule is implemented that makes the average faculty member pivotal. Our main policy implication is that consensus-based faculties, such as many in Europe, could improve the well-being of their members if they liberalized their internal decision making processes.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
Number of pages29
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • Academic faculties
  • university governance
  • organizational design
  • status organizations


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