How heuristics handle uncertainty

Henry Brighton, Gerd Gigerenzer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

Traditionally, it is assumed that a trade-off exists between effort and accuracy: The more effort we put in, the more accurate our inferences. This chapter shows how this trade-off does not hold in general, or even typically, by explaining how simple heuristics that ignore information can outperform more sophisticated inference strategies. Explanations of such “less-is-more” effects are given using statistical learning theory applied to situations where organisms face what is referred to as the bias–variance dilemma. Under conditions of uncertainty, it is argued, heuristics can both be more accurate and consume fewer resources than typical “rational” models of cognitive processing.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEcological Rationality
Subtitle of host publicationIntelligence in the World
EditorsPeter M Todd, Gerd Gigerenzer
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages33-60
Number of pages28
ISBN (Print)9780199682676
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameEcological Rationality: Intelligence in the World

Fingerprint

Heuristics
Inference
Uncertainty
Organism
Statistical Learning
Learning Theory
Resources
Cognitive Processing

Keywords

  • inference
  • bias–variance
  • dilemma
  • heuristics
  • unce

Cite this

Brighton, H., & Gigerenzer, G. (2012). How heuristics handle uncertainty. In P. M. Todd, & G. Gigerenzer (Eds.), Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World (pp. 33-60). (Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.003.0014
Brighton, Henry ; Gigerenzer, Gerd. / How heuristics handle uncertainty. Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World. editor / Peter M Todd ; Gerd Gigerenzer. Oxford University Press, 2012. pp. 33-60 (Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World).
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Brighton, H & Gigerenzer, G 2012, How heuristics handle uncertainty. in PM Todd & G Gigerenzer (eds), Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World. Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World, Oxford University Press, pp. 33-60. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.003.0014

How heuristics handle uncertainty. / Brighton, Henry; Gigerenzer, Gerd.

Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World. ed. / Peter M Todd; Gerd Gigerenzer. Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 33-60 (Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Scientific › peer-review

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Brighton H, Gigerenzer G. How heuristics handle uncertainty. In Todd PM, Gigerenzer G, editors, Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World. Oxford University Press. 2012. p. 33-60. (Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.003.0014

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