Hoe dik is het ik? Neurowetenschap en het ongrijpbare zelf

Translated title of the contribution: How thick is the I?: Neuroscience and the elusive self

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


This article explores the concept of self in relation to neuroscience. Four options are discussed on the basis of a key representative. The first is the dualist position where the non-material self controls its brain, as defended by Eccles. Next comes the option of the self as a relatively or completely powerless entity within the brain, as exemplified by Libet’s experiments on free will. The third option is the identity of self and brain, as argued by Dennett. The last option is the identity of self and body, and here Gallagher is the representative. It is shown that no monist position is completely consistently defended. In the conclusion, four factors are identified that hinder a simple and consistent monist conceptualisation of the self in the context of neuroscience.
Translated title of the contributionHow thick is the I?: Neuroscience and the elusive self
Original languageDutch
Pages (from-to)311-339
Number of pages28
JournalAlgemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2019


  • neuroscience
  • self
  • brain
  • dualism
  • monism
  • body-awareness


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