How to Organize Sequential Auctions

Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's

V. Ginsburgh, J.C. van Ours

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

In empirical studies of sequential auctions of identical objects prices have been found to decline.We study auctions of ancient Chinese porcelain recovered from shipwrecks.In these auctions there are very long sequences of lots of identical objects.We find that the average price decline is smaller in long sequences.It is especially large for the first pair of lots auctioned; it is also larger when the price of the previous lot was larger than (the upper bound of the range of) the pre-sale estimate of the previous lot and when the number of items in lots that follow each other increases.As a consequence, it appears that sellers may have some control over the sequence of prices and therefore on their revenue.Our results point to the fact that a sequence of lots each of which contains the same number of items generates more revenue than lots with varying number of items.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages27
Volume2003-25
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-25

Fingerprint

Natural experiment
Sequential auctions
Auctions
Revenue
Empirical study
Upper bound
Seller

Keywords

  • auctions
  • prices
  • estimation

Cite this

Ginsburgh, V., & van Ours, J. C. (2003). How to Organize Sequential Auctions: Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-25). Tilburg: Econometrics.
Ginsburgh, V. ; van Ours, J.C. / How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's. Tilburg : Econometrics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Ginsburgh, V & van Ours, JC 2003 'How to Organize Sequential Auctions: Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2003-25, Econometrics, Tilburg.

How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's. / Ginsburgh, V.; van Ours, J.C.

Tilburg : Econometrics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-25).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Ginsburgh V, van Ours JC. How to Organize Sequential Auctions: Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's. Tilburg: Econometrics. 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).