Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty on the World of Experience

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review


This chapter focuses on a number of respects in which Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of the world differ, despite other significant commonalities. Specifically, it discusses how both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of our experience of the world challenge Husserl’s assertion of the possibility of a worldless consciousness; how Heidegger’s discussion of the world entails a rejection of Husserl’s claim that the world is at bottom nature; and how Merleau-Ponty puts pressure on Husserl’s account of the necessary structure of the world. In concluding, and as a propaedeutic to adjudicating these disputes, this chapter aims to show why Husserl makes these contested claims. Specifically, it suggests that it is Husserl’s phenomenological conception of reason and his commitment to (this conception of) reason that motivate him to make the claims about our experience and world with which the later phenomenologists take issue.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford University Press
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jul 2018
Externally publishedYes


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