Husserl on the I Think

In this paper, I argue that we can get a better understanding of the function of the “I think” in Husserl’s phenomenology by considering the role of attention our experience of the world. Specifically, Husserl differentiates between the synthetic activity of conceptual determination and the activity of positing that is characteristic of any attentive awareness of the world. While both forms of activity are egoic according to Husserl, it is the latter that he aims to capture with the phrase “I think.” As I develop, this interpretation of the “I think” in terms of the activity that is characteristic of attentive consciousness, meets the three requirements mentioned above. After addressing several objections to Husserl’s position, I discuss one of its more significant implications. That is, Husserl’s account of the “I think” can be understood to sever the tie between reason in the sense of synthetic conceptual activity and reason as being responsive to how things are. And with this, those who are traditionally not considered capable of the first kind of reason (whether human or nonhuman) may therefore not necessarily be deprived of the second.