Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism

J. Binswanger, J. Prüfer

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The modern world is complex and difficult to understand for voters, who may hold beliefs that are at variance with reality. Politicians face incentives to pander to voters' beliefs to get reelected. We analyze the welfare effects of this pandering and show that it entails both costs and benefits. Moreover, we explore optimal constitutional design in the presence of imperfect information about how the world works. We compare indirect democracy to direct democracy and to delegation of policy making to independent agents. We find that indirect democracy is often welfare maximizing.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages41
Volume2009-10
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2009-10

Fingerprint

populism
welfare
democracy
direct democracy
politician
incentive
costs

Keywords

  • Imperfect information
  • beliefs
  • democracy
  • populism
  • accountabil- ity
  • experts

Cite this

Binswanger, J., & Prüfer, J. (2009). Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-10). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Binswanger, J. ; Prüfer, J. / Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Binswanger, J & Prüfer, J 2009 'Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2009-10, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism. / Binswanger, J.; Prüfer, J.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-10).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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KW - beliefs

KW - democracy

KW - populism

KW - accountabil- ity

KW - experts

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PB - Microeconomics

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Binswanger J, Prüfer J. Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2009. (CentER Discussion Paper).