Implementing cooperative solution concepts: A generalized bidding approach

Y. Ju, D. Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

38 Citations (Scopus)


This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)307-330
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2009


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