In search of worker's real effort reciprocity

A field and a laboratory experiment

H. Hennig-Schmidt, B. Rockenbach, A. Sadrieh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In an additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables an exact calculation of an employer's surplus from the work contract is a crucial prerequisite for a positive wage–effort relation. This demonstrates that an employee's reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake. (JEL: C91, C92, J41)
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)817-837
JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
Volume8
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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Wages
Workers
Laboratory experiments
Surplus
Work effort
Employees
Peers
Field experiment
Employers
Costs

Cite this

Hennig-Schmidt, H. ; Rockenbach, B. ; Sadrieh, A. / In search of worker's real effort reciprocity : A field and a laboratory experiment. In: Journal of the European Economic Association. 2010 ; Vol. 8, No. 4. pp. 817-837.
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Hennig-Schmidt, H, Rockenbach, B & Sadrieh, A 2010, 'In search of worker's real effort reciprocity: A field and a laboratory experiment', Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 817-837.

In search of worker's real effort reciprocity : A field and a laboratory experiment. / Hennig-Schmidt, H.; Rockenbach, B.; Sadrieh, A.

In: Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2010, p. 817-837.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Sadrieh, A.

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