Incentive effects of unemployment insurance savings accounts

Evidence from Chile

J.C. van Ours, G. Reyes, M. Vodopivec

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

The paper, the first one to empirically examine whether individual accounts internalize the cost of unemployment, estimates the determinants of job finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program. This is a unique, innovative program that combines social insurance, provided via solidarity funding, with self-insurance in the form of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs). The paper shows that beneficiaries who use solidarity funding are less likely to exit unemployment in early months than those relying on UISAs only. Moreover, job finding rates are found to be positively correlated with pre-separation UISA balances among those that use solidarity funding, but are found to be uncorrelated with balances for those relying on UISAs only. While the findings are consistent with the effects expected under the internalization of unemployment costs via UISAs, they do not pinpoint unambiguously the causal link, as alternative mechanisms may be responsible for the observed correlations, particularly selection into the use of UISAs.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)798-809
JournalLabour Economics
Volume18
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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Unemployment insurance
Chile
Incentive effect
Savings
Unemployment
Solidarity
Funding
Costs
Self-insurance
Internalization
Exit
Social insurance
Unemployment benefits

Cite this

van Ours, J.C. ; Reyes, G. ; Vodopivec, M. / Incentive effects of unemployment insurance savings accounts : Evidence from Chile. In: Labour Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 18, No. 6. pp. 798-809.
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Incentive effects of unemployment insurance savings accounts : Evidence from Chile. / van Ours, J.C.; Reyes, G.; Vodopivec, M.

In: Labour Economics, Vol. 18, No. 6, 2011, p. 798-809.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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