Indentities in the commons: The dynamics of norms and social capital

E.H. Bulte, R.D. Horan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper provides a formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation in the management of common property resources. We develop a dynamic model that includes moral norms or a sense of 'identity,' and show that cooperation may but need not be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of intervention by a managing agency or punishment by peers. We demonstrate that outside intervention has ambiguous effects when identity matters it may reduce welfare of the agents harvesting the stock.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-35
Number of pages35
JournalThe B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
Volume10
Issue number1 art. 13
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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