Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$-equilibria in games with almost perfect information

János Flesch, P.J.J. Herings, Jasmine Maes, Arkadi Predtetchinski

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during the game. We define and examine the new condition of individual upper semicontinuity on the payoff functions, which is weaker than upper semicontinuity. We prove that a game with individual upper semicontinuous payoff functions admits a subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for every ϵ>0, in eventually pure strategy profiles.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)695-719
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume73
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2022
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • almost perfect information
  • infinite game
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • individual upper semicontinuity

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