TY - JOUR
T1 - Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection
AU - u, Stanford
N1 - Funding Information:
Versions of this paper were presented in the 2019 Glasgow graduate conference in epistemology and mind, the 2019 Tübingen Masterclass in Theoretical Philosophy with Timothy Williamson, and the Knowledge and its Limits at 20 conference in the University of Geneva. I thank the audiences and commentators for helpful discussion. In addition, I would like to thank Johan van Benthem, Ray Briggs, and Krista Lawlor for the guidance and the many comments they offered in the process of writing this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous referees who provided detailed comments on the current and earlier versions of this paper.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - Cases of inexact observations have been used extensively in the recent literature on higher-order evidence and higher-order knowledge. I argue that the received understanding of inexact observations is mistaken. Although it is convenient to assume that such cases can be modeled statically, they should be analyzed as dynamic cases that involve change of knowledge. Consequently, the underlying logic should be dynamic epistemic logic, not its static counterpart. When reasoning about inexact knowledge, it is easy to confuse the initial situation, the observation process, and the result of the observation; I analyze the three separately. This dynamic approach has far reaching implications: Williamson’s influential argument against the KK principle loses its force, and new insights can be gained regarding synchronic and diachronic introspection principles.
AB - Cases of inexact observations have been used extensively in the recent literature on higher-order evidence and higher-order knowledge. I argue that the received understanding of inexact observations is mistaken. Although it is convenient to assume that such cases can be modeled statically, they should be analyzed as dynamic cases that involve change of knowledge. Consequently, the underlying logic should be dynamic epistemic logic, not its static counterpart. When reasoning about inexact knowledge, it is easy to confuse the initial situation, the observation process, and the result of the observation; I analyze the three separately. This dynamic approach has far reaching implications: Williamson’s influential argument against the KK principle loses its force, and new insights can be gained regarding synchronic and diachronic introspection principles.
KW - Dynamic epistemic logic
KW - Externalism
KW - Inexact knowledge
KW - Introspection principles
KW - Margin-for-error
KW - Safety
KW - The KK principle
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099956343&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11229-021-03033-7
DO - 10.1007/s11229-021-03033-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85099956343
SN - 0039-7857
VL - 199
SP - 5509
EP - 5531
JO - Synthese
JF - Synthese
IS - 3-4
ER -