Inference in (neuro)cognitive systems

Cognitive scientists ascribe inferential processes to (neuro)cognitive systems to explain many of their capacities. Since these ascriptions have different connotations, philosophical accounts of inference could help clarify their assumptions and forestall potential confusion. However, many existing accounts define inference in ways that are out of touch with successful scientific practice—ways that overly intellectualize inference, construe inference in complete opposition to association, and imply that inferential processes prevent minds from being in contact with the outside world. In this chapter, we sketch a philosophically viable, updated account of inference in (neuro)cognitive systems. According to this view, inference is a kind of rationally evaluable transition from some inputs and current representations to some subsequent or output representation. This notion of inference aligns with and can illuminate scientific practices in disparate fields while eschewing a commitment to conscious accessibility, a language-like neural code, or a formal system of mental logic, highlighting the continuity between inferential and associative processes and allowing for a “not-indirect” mind-world relationship, where minds are genuinely open and responsive to their environment.