Inferring Hawks and Doves from Voting Records

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Abstract

Abstract: We analyze revealed policy preferences in monetary policy committees. From the voting records of the Bank of England we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We analyze systematic patterns in these policy preferences. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences while pronounced policy preferences are generally held by external members. Committee members with a career in academia and the industry hold more diverse policy preferences whereas committee members with central bank experience exhibit little heterogeneity in preferences. The median voter does not vary systematically according to career background.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Number of pages31
Volume2013-024
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2013-024

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Keywords

  • Voting records
  • Central Banking
  • Committees
  • Ideal points

Cite this

Eijffinger, S. C. W., Mahieu, R. J., & Raes, L. B. D. (2013). Inferring Hawks and Doves from Voting Records. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-024). Tilburg: Economics.