Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

Sylvester Eijffinger, Ronald Mahieu, Louis Raes

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-120
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume51
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2018

Keywords

  • voting records
  • central banking
  • committees
  • ideal points

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