Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

Sylvester Eijffinger; Ronald Mahieu; Louis Raes

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

Sylvester Eijffinger, Ronald Mahieu, Louis Raes

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	107-120
Journal	European Journal of Political Economy
Volume	51
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004
Publication status	Published - Jan 2018

Keywords

voting records
central banking
committees
ideal points

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10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

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title = "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records",

abstract = "We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.",

keywords = "voting records, central banking, committees, ideal points",

author = "Sylvester Eijffinger and Ronald Mahieu and Louis Raes",

year = "2018",

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doi = "10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004",

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T1 - Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

AU - Eijffinger, Sylvester

AU - Mahieu, Ronald

AU - Raes, Louis

PY - 2018/1

Y1 - 2018/1

N2 - We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

AB - We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

KW - voting records

KW - central banking

KW - committees

KW - ideal points

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

M3 - Article

SN - 0176-2680

VL - 51

SP - 107

EP - 120

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

ER -

Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

Abstract

Keywords

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