Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-120
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume51
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2018

Fingerprint

voting
monetary policy
bank
Voting
industry

Keywords

  • voting records
  • central banking
  • committees
  • ideal points

Cite this

@article{90bf2e8945f94532b9f1000da4512ac6,
title = "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records",
abstract = "We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.",
keywords = "voting records, central banking, committees, ideal points",
author = "Sylvester Eijffinger and Ronald Mahieu and Louis Raes",
year = "2018",
month = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "107--120",
journal = "European Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0176-2680",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

Inferring hawks and doves from voting records. / Eijffinger, Sylvester; Mahieu, Ronald; Raes, Louis.

In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 51, 01.2018, p. 107-120.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Inferring hawks and doves from voting records

AU - Eijffinger, Sylvester

AU - Mahieu, Ronald

AU - Raes, Louis

PY - 2018/1

Y1 - 2018/1

N2 - We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

AB - We analyze revealed policy preferences of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. From the voting records we estimate the policy preferences with spatial models of voting. We find that internal committee members tend to hold centrist policy preferences, while more extreme policy preferences, both hawkish and dovish, are generally held by external members. An industry background is associated with more hawkish preferences.

KW - voting records

KW - central banking

KW - committees

KW - ideal points

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.004

M3 - Article

VL - 51

SP - 107

EP - 120

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0176-2680

ER -