Influencing Opinion Networks - Optimization and Games

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Abstract

We consider a model of influence over a network with finite-horizon opinion dynamics. The network consists of agents that update their opinions via a trust structure as in the DeGroot dynamics (De Groot (1974)). The model considers two potential external influencers that have fixed and opposite opinions. They aim to maximally impact the aggregate state of opinions at the end of the finite horizon by targeting one agent in one specific time period. In the case of only one influencer, we characterize optimal targets on the basis of two features: shift and amplification. Also, conditions are provided under which a specific target is optimal: the maximum-amplification target. In the case of two influencers, we focus on the existence and characterization of pure strategy equilibria in the corresponding two-person strategic zero-sum game. Roughly speaking, if the initial opinions are not too much in favour of either influencer, the influencers’ equilibrium behaviour is also driven by the amplification of targets.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages17
Volume2023-011
Publication statusPublished - 10 May 2023

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2023-011

Keywords

  • Opinion dynamics
  • networks
  • influence
  • targeting
  • Nash equilibria

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