Information Feedback in Public-Bad Games: A Cross-Country Experiment

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Abstract

In this paper we examine the impact of information on individual contributions in a public-bad experiment. We compare two experimental treatments. In the partial information treatment, subjects are only informed about the total contributions by their group, whereas in the full information treatment they get also feedback on the individual decisions of their group members. Both treatments have been performed in two countries: Norway and the Netherlands. The main results are that the average contributions are not significantly different between the information conditions in the two countries. Furthermore, a restart effect, which is often observed in public-good experiments, is also found here.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages18
Volume1999-102
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-102

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Keywords

  • Public bad
  • experiments
  • information feedback
  • cross-culture

Cite this

van der Heijden, E. C. M., & Moxnes, E. (1999). Information Feedback in Public-Bad Games: A Cross-Country Experiment. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-102). Microeconomics.