Informationally Robust Equlibria

J.H. Reijnierse, P.E.M. Borm, M. Voorneveld

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of equilibria of perturbed games.Here, the perturbation has to do with the hypothetical possibility that the action of one the players is revealed to his fellow player before the fellow player has to decide on his own action.Whereas Robson models these perturbations in extensive form and uses subgame perfection to solve these games, we model the perturbations in strategic form, thus remaining in the class of bimatrix games. Moreover, within the perturbations we impose two possible types of tie breaking rules, which leads to the notions optimistic and pessimistic IRE.The paper provides motivation on IRE and its definition.Several properties will be discussed.In particular, we have that IRE is a strict concept, and that IRE components are faces of Nash components.Specific results from potential games
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages24
Volume2003-14
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-14

Fingerprint

Perturbation
Bimatrix games
Potential games
Subgame perfection
Tie-breaking rules
Nash equilibrium
Perfect equilibrium
Extensive form

Keywords

  • nash equilibria
  • game theory
  • information

Cite this

Reijnierse, J. H., Borm, P. E. M., & Voorneveld, M. (2003). Informationally Robust Equlibria. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-14). Tilburg: Operations research.
Reijnierse, J.H. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Voorneveld, M. / Informationally Robust Equlibria. Tilburg : Operations research, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Reijnierse, JH, Borm, PEM & Voorneveld, M 2003 'Informationally Robust Equlibria' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2003-14, Operations research, Tilburg.

Informationally Robust Equlibria. / Reijnierse, J.H.; Borm, P.E.M.; Voorneveld, M.

Tilburg : Operations research, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-14).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AU - Reijnierse, J.H.

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AU - Voorneveld, M.

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N2 - Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of equilibria of perturbed games.Here, the perturbation has to do with the hypothetical possibility that the action of one the players is revealed to his fellow player before the fellow player has to decide on his own action.Whereas Robson models these perturbations in extensive form and uses subgame perfection to solve these games, we model the perturbations in strategic form, thus remaining in the class of bimatrix games. Moreover, within the perturbations we impose two possible types of tie breaking rules, which leads to the notions optimistic and pessimistic IRE.The paper provides motivation on IRE and its definition.Several properties will be discussed.In particular, we have that IRE is a strict concept, and that IRE components are faces of Nash components.Specific results from potential games

AB - Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of equilibria of perturbed games.Here, the perturbation has to do with the hypothetical possibility that the action of one the players is revealed to his fellow player before the fellow player has to decide on his own action.Whereas Robson models these perturbations in extensive form and uses subgame perfection to solve these games, we model the perturbations in strategic form, thus remaining in the class of bimatrix games. Moreover, within the perturbations we impose two possible types of tie breaking rules, which leads to the notions optimistic and pessimistic IRE.The paper provides motivation on IRE and its definition.Several properties will be discussed.In particular, we have that IRE is a strict concept, and that IRE components are faces of Nash components.Specific results from potential games

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Reijnierse JH, Borm PEM, Voorneveld M. Informationally Robust Equlibria. Tilburg: Operations research. 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).