We investigate patterns of abnormal stock performance around insider trades and option exercises on the Dutch market. Listed firms in the Netherlands have a long tradition of employing many anti-shareholder mechanisms limiting shareholders rights. Our results imply that insider transactions are more profitable at firms where shareholder rights are not restricted by anti-shareholder mechanisms. This finding goes against the monitoring hypothesis which states that more shareholder orientation and stronger blockholders would reduce the gains from insider trading. We show robust support for the substitution hypothesis as insiders of firms which effectively curtail shareholder rights enjoy valuable private benefits of control in lieu of engaging in insider trading to exploit their position.
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Number of pages||50|
|Publication status||Published - 2010|
|Name||CentER Discussion Paper|
- insider trading
- management stock options
- timing by insiders
- corporate governance
- anti-shareholder mechanisms
- anti-takeover mechanisms
Cziraki, P., de Goeij, P. C., & Renneboog, L. D. R. (2010). Insider Trading, Option Exercises and Private Benefits of Control (Revision of DP 2010-32). (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2010-90). Finance.