Abstract
one of the most important reasons why subjects cooperate. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 66 |
| Journal | Games |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sep 2018 |
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Instrumental reciprocity as an error. / Reuben, E.; Suetens, Sigrid.
In: Games, Vol. 9, No. 3, 66, 09.2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Instrumental reciprocity as an error
AU - Reuben, E.
AU - Suetens, Sigrid
PY - 2018/9
Y1 - 2018/9
N2 - We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity—that is, reciprocating cooperation only as long as there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, itone of the most important reasons why subjects cooperate. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
AB - We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity—that is, reciprocating cooperation only as long as there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, itone of the most important reasons why subjects cooperate. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
U2 - 10.3390/g9030066
DO - 10.3390/g9030066
M3 - Article
VL - 9
JO - Games
JF - Games
SN - 2073-4336
IS - 3
M1 - 66
ER -