Abstract
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 379-404 |
Journal | Public Finance and Management |
Volume | 10 |
Issue number | 2 |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
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International cooperation to combat climate change. / Ruis, A.; de Zeeuw, A.J.
In: Public Finance and Management, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, p. 379-404.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - International cooperation to combat climate change
AU - Ruis, A.
AU - de Zeeuw, A.J.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - Climate change is a global pollution problem and therefore regulation of this public bad requires international institutions. Since we do not have a government at the level of the world as a whole, we have to rely on voluntary cooperation between states. The literature on international environmental agreements is usually very pessimistic on the possibility to sustain large coalitions and the Kyoto Protocol proves this in practice. In this paper a number of options are developed that improve the situation. If the R&D costs of investments in green capital can be shared among the sig-natories, the size of the stable coalition can get larger. Further-more, if asymmetries are considered and the coalition consists of countries or regions with different characteristics, again the result can be improved, especially if transfers between signatories are possible. The paper develops an application to a set of six countries or regions in the world: USA, Japan, OECD Europe, Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and China.
AB - Climate change is a global pollution problem and therefore regulation of this public bad requires international institutions. Since we do not have a government at the level of the world as a whole, we have to rely on voluntary cooperation between states. The literature on international environmental agreements is usually very pessimistic on the possibility to sustain large coalitions and the Kyoto Protocol proves this in practice. In this paper a number of options are developed that improve the situation. If the R&D costs of investments in green capital can be shared among the sig-natories, the size of the stable coalition can get larger. Further-more, if asymmetries are considered and the coalition consists of countries or regions with different characteristics, again the result can be improved, especially if transfers between signatories are possible. The paper develops an application to a set of six countries or regions in the world: USA, Japan, OECD Europe, Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and China.
M3 - Article
VL - 10
SP - 379
EP - 404
JO - Public Finance and Management
JF - Public Finance and Management
SN - 1523-9721
IS - 2
ER -