International cooperation to combat climate change

A. Ruis, A.J. de Zeeuw

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Climate change is a global pollution problem and therefore regulation of this public bad requires international institutions. Since we do not have a government at the level of the world as a whole, we have to rely on voluntary cooperation between states. The literature on international environmental agreements is usually very pessimistic on the possibility to sustain large coalitions and the Kyoto Protocol proves this in practice. In this paper a number of options are developed that improve the situation. If the R&D costs of investments in green capital can be shared among the sig-natories, the size of the stable coalition can get larger. Further-more, if asymmetries are considered and the coalition consists of countries or regions with different characteristics, again the result can be improved, especially if transfers between signatories are possible. The paper develops an application to a set of six countries or regions in the world: USA, Japan, OECD Europe, Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and China.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)379-404
JournalPublic Finance and Management
Volume10
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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International cooperation
Climate change
Kyoto Protocol
China
Former Soviet Union
International institutions
Asymmetry
Global pollution
Government
Japan
International environmental agreements
Eastern Europe
Costs

Cite this

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International cooperation to combat climate change. / Ruis, A.; de Zeeuw, A.J.

In: Public Finance and Management, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, p. 379-404.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Ruis, A.

AU - de Zeeuw, A.J.

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AB - Climate change is a global pollution problem and therefore regulation of this public bad requires international institutions. Since we do not have a government at the level of the world as a whole, we have to rely on voluntary cooperation between states. The literature on international environmental agreements is usually very pessimistic on the possibility to sustain large coalitions and the Kyoto Protocol proves this in practice. In this paper a number of options are developed that improve the situation. If the R&D costs of investments in green capital can be shared among the sig-natories, the size of the stable coalition can get larger. Further-more, if asymmetries are considered and the coalition consists of countries or regions with different characteristics, again the result can be improved, especially if transfers between signatories are possible. The paper develops an application to a set of six countries or regions in the world: USA, Japan, OECD Europe, Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union and China.

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