International Fisheries Agreements

The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

K.H. Pham Do, H. Folmer

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages26
Volume2003-52
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-52

Fingerprint

fishery
fishing
co-operation
fish stock
migratory fish

Keywords

  • international fisheries
  • overexploitation
  • partial cooperation
  • games in partition function form
  • competitive equilibrium
  • modified Shapley value.

Cite this

Pham Do, K. H., & Folmer, H. (2003). International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-52). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Pham Do, K.H. ; Folmer, H. / International Fisheries Agreements : The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Pham Do, KH & Folmer, H 2003 'International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2003-52, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

International Fisheries Agreements : The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. / Pham Do, K.H.; Folmer, H.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-52).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.

KW - international fisheries

KW - overexploitation

KW - partial cooperation

KW - games in partition function form

KW - competitive equilibrium

KW - modified Shapley value.

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Pham Do KH, Folmer H. International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).