International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

K.H. Pham Do, H. Folmer

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This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
Number of pages26
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • international fisheries
  • overexploitation
  • partial cooperation
  • games in partition function form
  • competitive equilibrium
  • modified Shapley value.


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