Interval Game Theoretic Division Rules

R. Brânzei, M. Dall'Aglio, S.H. Tijs

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Abstract

Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty about the amounts of the estate and the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in the interval setting the classic results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs [Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fur Operations Research, 31 (1987), A 143 { A 159] that characterize division rules which are solutions of the cooperative bankruptcy game.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages19
Volume2008-97
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-97

Keywords

  • cooperative games
  • interval data
  • bankruptcy problems

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