Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?

H. Bester, W. Güth

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Abstract

    We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome depends on whether the individuals' interactions are strategic complements or substitutes. Altruism and self-interest are context dependent.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherCentER
    Volume1994-103
    Publication statusPublished - 1994

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume1994-103

    Fingerprint

    Altruism
    Individual preferences
    Strategic complements
    Strategic substitutes
    Interaction
    Evolutionary

    Keywords

    • Game Theory
    • Altruism
    • game theory

    Cite this

    Bester, H., & Güth, W. (1994). Is altruism evolutionarily stable ? (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1994-103). CentER.
    Bester, H. ; Güth, W. / Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?. CentER, 1994. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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    Bester, H & Güth, W 1994 'Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1994-103, CentER.

    Is altruism evolutionarily stable ? / Bester, H.; Güth, W.

    CentER, 1994. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1994-103).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Bester H, Güth W. Is altruism evolutionarily stable ? CentER. 1994. (CentER Discussion Paper).