Is pleasure all that is good about experience?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. In this article I present the claim that hedonism is not the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing. The value of experience should not be understood as being limited to pleasure, and as such, the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing is pluralistic, not hedonistic. In support of this claim, I argue first that pleasure should not be understood as a broad term to describe valuable experiences generally. I then analyze responses to the main argument against a monistic view on the value of experience: the philosophy of swine objection. I argue that such responses deviate from the central hedonistic view that only pleasure and pain matter for wellbeing. I then argue that the argument can be avoided on a pluralistic account, and formulate a plausible candidate for an account of pluralistic experientialism, in which, besides pleasure, non-hedonic aspects of experience like novelty, compassion, and aesthetic value also contribute to wellbeing.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1769-1787
Number of pages19
JournalPHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Volume176
Issue number7
Early online date2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2019

Fingerprint

Pleasure
Well-being
Novelty
Aesthetic Value
Compassion
Hedonism
Pain
Philosophy

Keywords

  • Hedonism
  • LIFE
  • MACHINE
  • Philosophy of swine
  • Pleasure
  • Pluralism
  • SENSORY PLEASURE
  • Wellbeing

Cite this

@article{99768872ebca4bc6a41fe27743dfcfbf,
title = "Is pleasure all that is good about experience?",
abstract = "Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. In this article I present the claim that hedonism is not the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing. The value of experience should not be understood as being limited to pleasure, and as such, the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing is pluralistic, not hedonistic. In support of this claim, I argue first that pleasure should not be understood as a broad term to describe valuable experiences generally. I then analyze responses to the main argument against a monistic view on the value of experience: the philosophy of swine objection. I argue that such responses deviate from the central hedonistic view that only pleasure and pain matter for wellbeing. I then argue that the argument can be avoided on a pluralistic account, and formulate a plausible candidate for an account of pluralistic experientialism, in which, besides pleasure, non-hedonic aspects of experience like novelty, compassion, and aesthetic value also contribute to wellbeing.",
keywords = "Hedonism, LIFE, MACHINE, Philosophy of swine, Pleasure, Pluralism, SENSORY PLEASURE, Wellbeing",
author = "{van der Deijl}, Willem",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-018-1090-y",
language = "English",
volume = "176",
pages = "1769--1787",
journal = "PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "7",

}

Is pleasure all that is good about experience? / van der Deijl, Willem.

In: PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, Vol. 176, No. 7, 07.2019, p. 1769-1787.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is pleasure all that is good about experience?

AU - van der Deijl, Willem

PY - 2019/7

Y1 - 2019/7

N2 - Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. In this article I present the claim that hedonism is not the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing. The value of experience should not be understood as being limited to pleasure, and as such, the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing is pluralistic, not hedonistic. In support of this claim, I argue first that pleasure should not be understood as a broad term to describe valuable experiences generally. I then analyze responses to the main argument against a monistic view on the value of experience: the philosophy of swine objection. I argue that such responses deviate from the central hedonistic view that only pleasure and pain matter for wellbeing. I then argue that the argument can be avoided on a pluralistic account, and formulate a plausible candidate for an account of pluralistic experientialism, in which, besides pleasure, non-hedonic aspects of experience like novelty, compassion, and aesthetic value also contribute to wellbeing.

AB - Experientialist accounts of wellbeing are those accounts of wellbeing that subscribe to the experience requirement. Typically, these accounts are hedonistic. In this article I present the claim that hedonism is not the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing. The value of experience should not be understood as being limited to pleasure, and as such, the most plausible experientialist account of wellbeing is pluralistic, not hedonistic. In support of this claim, I argue first that pleasure should not be understood as a broad term to describe valuable experiences generally. I then analyze responses to the main argument against a monistic view on the value of experience: the philosophy of swine objection. I argue that such responses deviate from the central hedonistic view that only pleasure and pain matter for wellbeing. I then argue that the argument can be avoided on a pluralistic account, and formulate a plausible candidate for an account of pluralistic experientialism, in which, besides pleasure, non-hedonic aspects of experience like novelty, compassion, and aesthetic value also contribute to wellbeing.

KW - Hedonism

KW - LIFE

KW - MACHINE

KW - Philosophy of swine

KW - Pleasure

KW - Pluralism

KW - SENSORY PLEASURE

KW - Wellbeing

UR - https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/99768872-ebca-4bc6-a41f-e27743dfcfbf

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-018-1090-y

DO - 10.1007/s11098-018-1090-y

M3 - Article

VL - 176

SP - 1769

EP - 1787

JO - PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

JF - PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 7

ER -