TY - JOUR
T1 - It was a Different Time
T2 - Judging Historical Figures by Today’s Moral Standards
AU - Archer, Alfred
AU - Matheson, Benjamin
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied Philosophy.
PY - 2024/1/28
Y1 - 2024/1/28
N2 - How should we respond to historical figures who played an important role in their country's history but have also perpetrated acts of great evil? Much of the existing philosophical literature on this topic has focused on explaining why it may be wrong to celebrate such figures. However, a common response that is made in popular discussions around these issues is that we should not judge historical figures by today's standards. Our goal in this article is to examine the most plausible way to understand this objection. We will examine three different interpretations of this argument. First, we will examine a view we call Temporal Moral Relativism, according to which moral standards are relative to particular points in time. Next, we outline Blame Relativism, the view that people from the past may be excused from blame for acts of conventionalised wrongdoing. Finally, we outline Ideals Relativism, according to which our moral ideals are partially relative to the time in which we live. We argue that Ideals Relativism provides the most plausible interpretation of this argument.
AB - How should we respond to historical figures who played an important role in their country's history but have also perpetrated acts of great evil? Much of the existing philosophical literature on this topic has focused on explaining why it may be wrong to celebrate such figures. However, a common response that is made in popular discussions around these issues is that we should not judge historical figures by today's standards. Our goal in this article is to examine the most plausible way to understand this objection. We will examine three different interpretations of this argument. First, we will examine a view we call Temporal Moral Relativism, according to which moral standards are relative to particular points in time. Next, we outline Blame Relativism, the view that people from the past may be excused from blame for acts of conventionalised wrongdoing. Finally, we outline Ideals Relativism, according to which our moral ideals are partially relative to the time in which we live. We argue that Ideals Relativism provides the most plausible interpretation of this argument.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85183672807&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/japp.12713
DO - 10.1111/japp.12713
M3 - Article
SN - 0264-3758
JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy
JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy
ER -