Job Market Signalling and Screening

An Experimental Comparison

D. Kübler, W. Müller, H.T. Normann

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

297 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested.More efficient workers also earn higher wages.Employers' pro¯ts are usually not different from zero.Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions.We ¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages33
Volume2003-124
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-124

Fingerprint

Screening
Employers
Workers
Job market
Wages
Bid
Experimental markets
Education

Keywords

  • labour market
  • games

Cite this

Kübler, D., Müller, W., & Normann, H. T. (2003). Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-124). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Kübler, D. ; Müller, W. ; Normann, H.T. / Job Market Signalling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).
@techreport{f25d321561814b6889f91a50bb7027ea,
title = "Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison",
abstract = "We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e{\circledR}ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested.More efficient workers also earn higher wages.Employers' pro¯ts are usually not different from zero.Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions.We ¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.",
keywords = "labour market, games",
author = "D. K{\"u}bler and W. M{\"u}ller and H.T. Normann",
note = "Subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior (2008) Pagination: 33",
year = "2003",
language = "English",
volume = "2003-124",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",

}

Kübler, D, Müller, W & Normann, HT 2003 'Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2003-124, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Job Market Signalling and Screening : An Experimental Comparison. / Kübler, D.; Müller, W.; Normann, H.T.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-124).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Job Market Signalling and Screening

T2 - An Experimental Comparison

AU - Kübler, D.

AU - Müller, W.

AU - Normann, H.T.

N1 - Subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior (2008) Pagination: 33

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested.More efficient workers also earn higher wages.Employers' pro¯ts are usually not different from zero.Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions.We ¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.

AB - We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested.More efficient workers also earn higher wages.Employers' pro¯ts are usually not different from zero.Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions.We ¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.

KW - labour market

KW - games

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2003-124

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Job Market Signalling and Screening

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Kübler D, Müller W, Normann HT. Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2003. (CentER Discussion Paper).