Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison

D. Kübler, W. Müller, H.T. Normann

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Abstract

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e®ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested.More efficient workers also earn higher wages.Employers' pro¯ts are usually not different from zero.Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions.We ¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages33
Volume2003-124
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-124

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Keywords

  • labour market
  • games

Cite this

Kübler, D., Müller, W., & Normann, H. T. (2003). Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-124). Microeconomics.