@techreport{f25d321561814b6889f91a50bb7027ea,
title = "Job Market Signalling and Screening: An Experimental Comparison",
abstract = "We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets.We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the e{\textregistered}ect of increasing the number of employers from two to three.In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate.More efficient workers invest more often and employers bid higher for workers who have invested.More efficient workers also earn higher wages.Employers' pro¯ts are usually not different from zero.Increased competition leads to higher wages only in the signaling sessions.We ¯nd that workers in the screening sessions invest more often and earn higher wages when there are two employers.",
keywords = "labour market, games",
author = "D. K{\"u}bler and W. M{\"u}ller and H.T. Normann",
note = "Subsequently published in Games and Economic Behavior (2008) Pagination: 33",
year = "2003",
language = "English",
volume = "2003-124",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}