Joint ordering in multiple news-vendor problems : a game-theoretical approach

M. Slikker, J.C. Fransoo, Marc Wouters

Research output: Book/ReportBookScientific

Abstract

We study a situation with n retailers, each of them facing a news-vendor problem, i.e., selling to customers over a finite period of time (product with a short life cycle, such as fashion). Groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by cooperating. We analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game, called a general news-vendor game, for such a situation with n retailers. We concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news-vendor games. Besides some results on convexity we prove that general newsvendor games have non-empty cores, which answers an open question of Hartman et al. (2000).
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationEindhoven
PublisherTechnische Universiteit Eindhoven
ISBN (Print)90-386-1637-6
Publication statusPublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameBETA publicatie : working papers

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