Labor representation in governance as an insurance mechanism

E. Han Kim, Ernst Maug, Christoph Schneider

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We hypothesize that labor participation in governance helps improve risk sharing between employees and employers. It provides an ex-post mechanism to enforce implicit insurance contracts protecting employees against adverse shocks. Results based on German establishment-level data show that skilled employees of firms with 50% labor representation on boards are protected against layoffs during adverse industry shocks. They pay an insurance premium of 3.3% in the form of lower wages. Unskilled blue-collar workers are unprotected against shocks. Our evidence suggests that workers capture all the gains from improved risk sharing, whereas shareholders are no better or worse off than without codetermination.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1251-1289
JournalReview of Finance
Volume22
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2018

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Governance
Employees
Insurance
Labor
Risk sharing
Blue-collar workers
Participation
Co-determination
Wages
Industry shock
Employers
Workers
Layoffs
Shareholders
Insurance contract
Insurance premium

Cite this

Kim, E. Han ; Maug, Ernst ; Schneider, Christoph. / Labor representation in governance as an insurance mechanism. In: Review of Finance. 2018 ; Vol. 22, No. 4. pp. 1251-1289.
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Labor representation in governance as an insurance mechanism. / Kim, E. Han; Maug, Ernst; Schneider, Christoph.

In: Review of Finance, Vol. 22, No. 4, 07.2018, p. 1251-1289.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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