Abstract
This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker–firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 108-111 |
| Journal | Economics Letters |
| Volume | 109 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
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Gielen, A. C., & van Ours, J. C. (2010). Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations. Economics Letters, 109(2), 108-111.