Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

A. C. Gielen; J.C. van Ours

Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

A. C. Gielen, J.C. van Ours

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker–firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	108-111
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	109
Issue number	2
Publication status	Published - 2010

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title = "Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations",

abstract = "This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker–firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.",

author = "Gielen, {A. C.} and {van Ours}, J.C.",

note = "Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2006-57 (rt)",

year = "2010",

language = "English",

volume = "109",

pages = "108--111",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

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T1 - Layoffs, quits and wage negotiations

AU - Gielen, A. C.

AU - van Ours, J.C.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2006-57 (rt)

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker–firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.

AB - This paper studies the ex-ante effect of worker separations on wage negotiations using matched worker–firm data from The Netherlands. We find that wage negotiations aim to prevent separations; workers with a high propensity to quit are offered higher wages, while workers with a high layoff probability give up some of their wage.

M3 - Article

VL - 109

SP - 108

EP - 111

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

IS - 2

ER -