Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption

J.P. Caulkins, G. Feichtinger, D. Grass, R.F. Hartl, P.M. Kort, A.J. Novak, A. Seidl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We present a novel model of corruption dynamics in the form of a nonlinear optimal dynamic control problem. It has a tipping point, but one whose origins and character are distinct from that in the classic Schelling (1978) model. The decision maker choosing a level of corruption is the chief or some other kind of authority figure who presides over a bureaucracy whose state of corruption is influenced by the authority figure’s actions, and whose state in turn influences the pay-off for the authority figure. The policy interpretation is somewhat more optimistic than in other tipping models, and there are some surprising implications, notably that reforming the bureaucracy may be of limited value if the bureaucracy takes its cues from a corrupt leader.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)541-546
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume225
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013

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Figure
Alternatives
Dynamic Control
Dynamic Problem
Reforming reactions
Control Problem
Optimal Control
Model
Distinct
Alternative models
Authority
Bureaucracy
Corruption
Influence
Policy
Character
Form
Interpretation
Decision maker

Keywords

  • corruption
  • tipping point
  • skiba point
  • optimal control

Cite this

Caulkins, J.P. ; Feichtinger, G. ; Grass, D. ; Hartl, R.F. ; Kort, P.M. ; Novak, A.J. ; Seidl, A. / Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption. In: European Journal of Operational Research. 2013 ; Vol. 225, No. 3. pp. 541-546.
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Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption. / Caulkins, J.P.; Feichtinger, G.; Grass, D.; Hartl, R.F.; Kort, P.M.; Novak, A.J.; Seidl, A.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 225, No. 3, 03.2013, p. 541-546.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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