Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games: An Economic Investigation

A. Blume, D.V. DeJong, G. Neumann, N.E. Savin

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Abstract

This paper compares the performance of stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from game theory experiments. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in common interest games with history while the test results accept SR and reject BBL in games with no history and in all but one of the divergent interest games. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the results may be subject to convergence bias.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages48
Volume2000-09
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-09

Keywords

  • econometrics
  • game theory and experiments

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