Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models

A. Possajennikov

Research output: Thesis › Doctoral Thesis

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Abstract

Dynamic models of adjustment, as well as static models of equilibrium, are important to understand economic reality. This thesis considers such dynamic models applied to economic games. The models can broadly be divided into two categories: learning and evolution. This thesis analyzes reinforcement learning and imitation dynamic on the learning side and the indirect evolution approach on the evolution side. It demonstrates the relation between the concept of Nash equilibrium and the long run outcome of the namic processes. The applications of the dynamic models to economic games include, among others, Cournot oligopoly and merger games.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • van Damme, Eric, Promotor
Award date8 Mar 2000
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9056680641
Publication statusPublished - 2000

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Economics
Oligopoly
Cournot oligopoly
Imitation
Nash equilibrium
Reinforcement learning
Indirect evolution
Mergers

Cite this

Possajennikov, A. (2000). Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Possajennikov, A.. / Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2000. 142 p.
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Possajennikov, A 2000, 'Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models. / Possajennikov, A.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2000. 142 p.

Research output: Thesis › Doctoral Thesis

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AB - Dynamic models of adjustment, as well as static models of equilibrium, are important to understand economic reality. This thesis considers such dynamic models applied to economic games. The models can broadly be divided into two categories: learning and evolution. This thesis analyzes reinforcement learning and imitation dynamic on the learning side and the indirect evolution approach on the evolution side. It demonstrates the relation between the concept of Nash equilibrium and the long run outcome of the namic processes. The applications of the dynamic models to economic games include, among others, Cournot oligopoly and merger games.

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Possajennikov A. Learning and evolution in games and oligopoly models. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2000. 142 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).

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