Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games

A. Blume

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Abstract

    This paper investigates a class of population-learning dynamics. In every period agents either adopt a best reply to the current distribution of actual play, or a best reply to a sample, taken with replacement, from the distribution of intended play (the strategies adopted at the end of last period), or they are inactive. If sampling with replacement and being inactive have strictly positive probability, these dynamics converge globally to minimal curb sets in the absence of mistakes. For two-player i x j-games, i; j .le. 3; the same result holds even if only best responding to actual play and being inactive have positive probability. If players make mistakes in the implementation of their strategies, these dynamics select among minimal curb sets .
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherCentER
    Volume1995-65
    Publication statusPublished - 1995

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume1995-65

    Fingerprint

    Experimentation
    Replacement
    Learning dynamics
    Dynamic strategy
    Sampling

    Cite this

    Blume, A. (1995). Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-65). CentER.
    Blume, A. / Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games. CentER, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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    abstract = "This paper investigates a class of population-learning dynamics. In every period agents either adopt a best reply to the current distribution of actual play, or a best reply to a sample, taken with replacement, from the distribution of intended play (the strategies adopted at the end of last period), or they are inactive. If sampling with replacement and being inactive have strictly positive probability, these dynamics converge globally to minimal curb sets in the absence of mistakes. For two-player i x j-games, i; j .le. 3; the same result holds even if only best responding to actual play and being inactive have positive probability. If players make mistakes in the implementation of their strategies, these dynamics select among minimal curb sets .",
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    Blume, A 1995 'Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-65, CentER.

    Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games. / Blume, A.

    CentER, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-65).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Blume A. Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games. CentER. 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).