Do lending relationships mitigate credit rationing? Does securitization influence the impact of lending relationships on credit rationing? If so, is its impact differently in normal periods versus crisis periods? This paper combines several unique data sets to address these questions. Employing a disequilibrium model to identify credit rationing, we find that more intense lending relationships, measured through their length and lower number, considerable improve credit supply and reduce the degree of credit rationing. In general, we find that a relationship with a bank that is more involved in securitization activities relaxes credit constraints in normal periods; however, it also increases credit rationing during crisis periods. Finally, we study the impact of different types of securitization – covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) – on credit rationing. While both types of securitization reduce credit rationing in normal periods, the issuance of MBS by a firm’s main bank aggravates these firm’s credit rationing in crisis periods.
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Number of pages||34|
|Publication status||Published - 2011|
|Name||EBC Discussion Paper|
- lending relationships
- financial crisis