Link formation in cooperative situations

B. Dutta, C.G.A.M. van den Nouweland, S.H. Tijs

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Abstract

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures. A by-product of our analysis is a characterization of the class of weighted Myerson values.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages29
Volume1995-35
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-35

Fingerprint

Equilibrium refinements
Myerson value
Communication
TU game
Cooperative game
Graph

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • game theory

Cite this

Dutta, B., van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M., & Tijs, S. H. (1995). Link formation in cooperative situations. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-35). Unknown Publisher.
Dutta, B. ; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M. ; Tijs, S.H. / Link formation in cooperative situations. Unknown Publisher, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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abstract = "In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures. A by-product of our analysis is a characterization of the class of weighted Myerson values.",
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Dutta, B, van den Nouweland, CGAM & Tijs, SH 1995 'Link formation in cooperative situations' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-35, Unknown Publisher.

Link formation in cooperative situations. / Dutta, B.; van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.; Tijs, S.H.

Unknown Publisher, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-35).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Link formation in cooperative situations

AU - Dutta, B.

AU - van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.

AU - Tijs, S.H.

N1 - Pagination: 29

PY - 1995

Y1 - 1995

N2 - In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures. A by-product of our analysis is a characterization of the class of weighted Myerson values.

AB - In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures. A by-product of our analysis is a characterization of the class of weighted Myerson values.

KW - Game Theory

KW - game theory

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1995-35

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Link formation in cooperative situations

PB - Unknown Publisher

ER -

Dutta B, van den Nouweland CGAM, Tijs SH. Link formation in cooperative situations. Unknown Publisher. 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).