Link formation in cooperative situations

B. Dutta, C.G.A.M. van den Nouweland, S.H. Tijs

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Abstract

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of cooperation structure formation as a game in strategic form. It is shown that several equilibrium refinements predict the formation of the complete cooperation structure or some structure which is payoff-equivalent to the complete structure. These results are obtained for a large class of solutions for cooperative games with cooperation structures. A by-product of our analysis is a characterization of the class of weighted Myerson values.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages29
Volume1995-35
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-35

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • game theory

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    Dutta, B., van den Nouweland, C. G. A. M., & Tijs, S. H. (1995). Link formation in cooperative situations. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-35). Unknown Publisher.