Abstract
that condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusive
rebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU considered
that in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,
has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 579-615 |
| Journal | Journal of Competition Law and Economics |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Publication status | Published - Sep 2015 |
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Loyalty rebates after intel : Time for the European Court of Justice to overrule Hoffman-La Roche. / Geradin, Damien.
In: Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 09.2015, p. 579-615.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Loyalty rebates after intel
T2 - Time for the European Court of Justice to overrule Hoffman-La Roche
AU - Geradin, Damien
PY - 2015/9
Y1 - 2015/9
N2 - In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commissionthat condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusiverebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU consideredthat in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.
AB - In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commissionthat condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusiverebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU consideredthat in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.
M3 - Article
VL - 11
SP - 579
EP - 615
JO - Journal of Competition Law and Economics
JF - Journal of Competition Law and Economics
SN - 1744-6414
IS - 3
ER -