Loyalty rebates after intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to overrule Hoffman-La Roche

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

    Abstract

    In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commission
    that condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusive
    rebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU considered
    that in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,
    has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)579-615
    JournalJournal of Competition Law and Economics
    Volume11
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - Sep 2015

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    European Court of Justice
    loyalty
    illegality
    case law
    pricing
    criticism
    Teaching
    economics
    time
    Loyalty
    Rebates
    coherence
    Exclusive dealing
    Criticism
    Economics
    Pricing

    Cite this

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    title = "Loyalty rebates after intel: Time for the European Court of Justice to overrule Hoffman-La Roche",
    abstract = "In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commissionthat condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusiverebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU consideredthat in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.",
    author = "Damien Geradin",
    year = "2015",
    month = "9",
    language = "English",
    volume = "11",
    pages = "579--615",
    journal = "Journal of Competition Law and Economics",
    issn = "1744-6414",
    publisher = "Oxford University Press",
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    }

    Loyalty rebates after intel : Time for the European Court of Justice to overrule Hoffman-La Roche. / Geradin, Damien.

    In: Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 09.2015, p. 579-615.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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    AB - In June 2014, the GCEU confirmed the Decision of the European Commissionthat condemned Intel for breaching Article 102 TFEU by adopting exclusiverebates and “naked restrictions.” This judgment, in which the GCEU consideredthat in line with Hoffman-La Roche loyalty rebates should be quasi-per se illegal,has been subject to many criticisms as it is not in line with the teachings of economics. This article discusses the shortcomings of this judgment and argues that it is a great time for the CJEU to abandon the application of its quasi-per se rule of illegality approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates and replace that application with a structured rule of reason. Such an approach would have many advantages and create greater coherence in the case law of the CJEU on unilateral pricing conduct.

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