Lying about what you know or about what you do?

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Abstract

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player’s contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less—and thereby lies less frequently—when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1204-1229
JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
Volume11
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Communication
Private information
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@article{da16de2e0e5f4eebad4b5c7408858b2d,
title = "Lying about what you know or about what you do?",
abstract = "We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player’s contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less—and thereby lies less frequently—when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying.",
author = "{Serra Garcia}, M. and {van Damme}, E.E.C. and J.J.M. Potters",
note = "Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2011-139",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1111/jeea.12034",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "1204--1229",
journal = "Journal of the European Economic Association",
issn = "1542-4774",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "5",

}

Lying about what you know or about what you do? / Serra Garcia, M.; van Damme, E.E.C.; Potters, J.J.M.

In: Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2013, p. 1204-1229.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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T1 - Lying about what you know or about what you do?

AU - Serra Garcia, M.

AU - van Damme, E.E.C.

AU - Potters, J.J.M.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER Discussion Paper 2011-139

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player’s contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less—and thereby lies less frequently—when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying.

AB - We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player’s contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less—and thereby lies less frequently—when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying.

U2 - 10.1111/jeea.12034

DO - 10.1111/jeea.12034

M3 - Article

VL - 11

SP - 1204

EP - 1229

JO - Journal of the European Economic Association

JF - Journal of the European Economic Association

SN - 1542-4774

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