Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)

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Abstract

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-riding depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less, and thereby lies less frequently, when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-riding and less lying.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Number of pages41
Volume2011-139
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-139

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communication

Keywords

  • Information transmission
  • lying
  • communication
  • experiment

Cite this

Serra Garcia, M., van Damme, E. E. C., & Potters, J. J. M. (2011). Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033). (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-139). Tilburg: Economics.
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abstract = "We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-riding depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less, and thereby lies less frequently, when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-riding and less lying.",
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Serra Garcia, M, van Damme, EEC & Potters, JJM 2011 'Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-139, Economics, Tilburg.

Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033). / Serra Garcia, M.; van Damme, E.E.C.; Potters, J.J.M.

Tilburg : Economics, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-139).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)

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AU - van Damme, E.E.C.

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N1 - Pagination: 41

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-riding depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less, and thereby lies less frequently, when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-riding and less lying.

AB - We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-riding depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less, and thereby lies less frequently, when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-riding and less lying.

KW - Information transmission

KW - lying

KW - communication

KW - experiment

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Serra Garcia M, van Damme EEC, Potters JJM. Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033). Tilburg: Economics. 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).