Abstract
This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situation
in which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutions
to achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoice
rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identify
a direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules may
affect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:
(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"
(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic
rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)
In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictator
are more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groups
with a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
| Number of pages | 49 |
| Volume | 2019-011 |
| Publication status | Published - 29 Apr 2019 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2019-011 |
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Keywords
- collective decision-making
- social dilemma
- institutions
- majority rule
- dictatorship
- cooperation
Cite this
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Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions. / Liu, Manwei; van der Heijden, Eline.
Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-011).Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output
TY - UNPB
T1 - Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions
AU - Liu, Manwei
AU - van der Heijden, Eline
N1 - CentER Discussion Paper Nr. 2019-011
PY - 2019/4/29
Y1 - 2019/4/29
N2 - Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situationin which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutionsto achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoicerules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identifya direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules mayaffect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democraticrule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictatorare more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groupswith a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.
AB - Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situationin which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutionsto achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoicerules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identifya direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules mayaffect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democraticrule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictatorare more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groupswith a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.
KW - collective decision-making
KW - social dilemma
KW - institutions
KW - majority rule
KW - dictatorship
KW - cooperation
M3 - Discussion paper
VL - 2019-011
T3 - CentER Discussion Paper
BT - Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions
PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research
CY - Tilburg
ER -