Abstract
Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.
This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situation
in which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutions
to achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoice
rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identify
a direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules may
affect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:
(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"
(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic
rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)
In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictator
are more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groups
with a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.
This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situation
in which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutions
to achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoice
rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identify
a direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules may
affect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:
(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"
(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic
rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)
In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictator
are more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groups
with a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Place of Publication | Tilburg |
Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
Number of pages | 49 |
Volume | 2019-011 |
Publication status | Published - 29 Apr 2019 |
Publication series
Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
---|---|
Volume | 2019-011 |
Keywords
- collective decision-making
- social dilemma
- institutions
- majority rule
- dictatorship
- cooperation