Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

34 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.
This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situation
in which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutions
to achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoice
rules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identify
a direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules may
affect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:
(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"
(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democratic
rule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)
In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictator
are more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groups
with a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages49
Volume2019-011
Publication statusPublished - 29 Apr 2019

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2019-011

Fingerprint

Majority rule
Dictatorship
Social dilemma
Collective choice
Dictator
Group performance
Institutional choice
Group behavior
Direct effect
Majority voting
Indirect effects
Premium
Democracy
Self-governance

Keywords

  • collective decision-making
  • social dilemma
  • institutions
  • majority rule
  • dictatorship
  • cooperation

Cite this

@techreport{78b5d351486e425da0702492b5a8f196,
title = "Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions",
abstract = "Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situationin which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutionsto achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoicerules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identifya direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules mayaffect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium{"}(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democraticrule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictatorare more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groupswith a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.",
keywords = "collective decision-making, social dilemma, institutions, majority rule, dictatorship, cooperation",
author = "Manwei Liu and {van der Heijden}, Eline",
note = "CentER Discussion Paper Nr. 2019-011",
year = "2019",
month = "4",
day = "29",
language = "English",
volume = "2019-011",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",

}

Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions. / Liu, Manwei; van der Heijden, Eline.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-011).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions

AU - Liu, Manwei

AU - van der Heijden, Eline

N1 - CentER Discussion Paper Nr. 2019-011

PY - 2019/4/29

Y1 - 2019/4/29

N2 - Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situationin which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutionsto achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoicerules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identifya direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules mayaffect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democraticrule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictatorare more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groupswith a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.

AB - Collective-choice rules aggregate individual choices into a group choice.This study addresses the role of collective-choice rules in a social dilemma situationin which group members can repeatedly choose a combination of institutionsto achieve self-governance. Specifically, we investigate three collectivechoicerules: majority voting, dictatorship and rotating dictatorship. We identifya direct and an indirect channel through which collective-choice rules mayaffect groups’ behavior and performance in the game. Our main findings are:(1) In terms of the direct effects, there is no evidence of a “democracy premium"(i.e., cooperation level is higher under the institutions chosen via a democraticrule than when the same institutions are chosen via a non-democratic rule). (2)In terms of the indirect effects, institutional choices produced by a fixed dictatorare more stable than produced by rotating dictators. (3) Overall, groupswith a fixed dictator earn the highest payoffs.

KW - collective decision-making

KW - social dilemma

KW - institutions

KW - majority rule

KW - dictatorship

KW - cooperation

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2019-011

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Majority rule or dictatorship? The role of collective-choice rules in resolving social dilemmas with endogenous institutions

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -