Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly

A comment

Thijs Jansen, A.J. van Lier, A. van Witteloostuijn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

A differentiated Cournot duopoly is considered where firm owners delegate the output decision to a manager, who is rewarded on the basis of his performance. If this performance is measured in terms of (i) pure profits, (ii) a combination of profits and sales, (iii) a combination of profits and market share or (iv) relative profits, the latter option strictly dominates the others if the products are perfect substitutes. Recently it was claimed that this result does not hold for all levels of product substitutability. In this comment, we show however that this result is robust against the introduction of product differentiation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)61-70
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume33
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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Profitability
Sales
Managers
Bonus system
Profit
Duopoly
Substitutability
Cournot duopoly
Substitute
Product differentiation
Owners
Profit share
Market share

Cite this

Jansen, Thijs ; van Lier, A.J. ; van Witteloostuijn, A. / Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly : A comment. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 33, No. 1. pp. 61-70.
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Jansen, T, van Lier, AJ & van Witteloostuijn, A 2012, 'Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly: A comment', Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 61-70. https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.1562

Managerial bonus systems in a differentiated duopoly : A comment. / Jansen, Thijs; van Lier, A.J.; van Witteloostuijn, A.

In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2012, p. 61-70.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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