Managerial delegation and welfare effects of cost reductions

M. Jansen, A.J. van Lier, A. van Witteloostuijn

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We extend the literature on the welfare effects of cost reductions by developing strategic delegation Cournot oligopoly games with n firms, linear cost and demand functions, and sales bonuses. Our method generalizes Zhao (Int J Ind Organ 19:455–469, 2001), and expresses the results in terms of the effects of both small and large cost reductions. We find that the firm exit region with sales delegation is larger than in the classical Cournot duopoly benchmark case. We prove that the likelihood of a welfare loss after a cost reduction by an inefficient firm is higher with sales delegation. We show that repairing the welfare loss from such a cost reduction for any n>2 requires firm exit.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-23
JournalJournal of Economics
Volume116
Issue number1
Early online date21 Nov 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2015

Fingerprint

Welfare effects
Delegation
Firm exit
Welfare loss
Benchmark
Cournot oligopoly
Demand function
Cournot duopoly
Bonuses
Cost function
Strategic delegation

Keywords

  • managerial incentives
  • cost reduction
  • Cournot oligopoly
  • welfare effects

Cite this

Jansen, M. ; van Lier, A.J. ; van Witteloostuijn, A. / Managerial delegation and welfare effects of cost reductions. In: Journal of Economics. 2015 ; Vol. 116, No. 1. pp. 1-23.
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Jansen, M, van Lier, AJ & van Witteloostuijn, A 2015, 'Managerial delegation and welfare effects of cost reductions', Journal of Economics, vol. 116, no. 1, pp. 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0428-y

Managerial delegation and welfare effects of cost reductions. / Jansen, M.; van Lier, A.J.; van Witteloostuijn, A.

In: Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 1, 09.2015, p. 1-23.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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