Managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information

Eirini Spiliotopoulou*, Karen Donohue, Mustafa Cagri Gurbuz, H. Sebastian Heese

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Consider a firm that controls inventory centrally for two separate markets that are managed by regional managers having local demand information. The central planner provides a dedicated inventory level to each market, to ensure a minimum service level, but can reallocate inventory once associated demands are filled. How should such a firm solicit regional managers to share their local information so inventory levels can be set efficiently? In this paper, we study a forecast sharing game in such a firm, where demand information lies within regions and inventory is managed by a central decision maker. We show that incentives are misaligned and truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium. We study two potential ways to improve the system: a) regional managers directly place orders (rather than simply passing demand forecasts), or b) a pricing scheme for inventory reallocations is imposed. We show that under direct ordering a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and makes retailers place orders based on their true forecasts, although the requested order quantities are not system optimal (e.g., some inventory pooling benefits are lost). Under an endogenous transfer pricing mechanism set by the central planner, we find that a first best truth telling equilibrium is possible under certain conditions. We conduct a numerical study to examine the different cases and find that when the critical fractile is high, direct ordering results in lower inventories while the reverse is true when the critical fractile is low. Expected profit comparisons show the value of local information.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)531-542
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume266
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 Apr 2018
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Supply chain management
  • Forecast sharing
  • Inventory commitments/reallocations
  • Information asymmetry
  • Game theory

Cite this

Spiliotopoulou, Eirini ; Donohue, Karen ; Cagri Gurbuz, Mustafa ; Heese, H. Sebastian. / Managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information. In: European Journal of Operational Research. 2018 ; Vol. 266, No. 2. pp. 531-542.
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Managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information. / Spiliotopoulou, Eirini; Donohue, Karen; Cagri Gurbuz, Mustafa; Heese, H. Sebastian.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 266, No. 2, 16.04.2018, p. 531-542.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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