Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure

Y. Funaki, H.E.D. Houba, E. Motchenkova

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Abstract

    Abstract: We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare. Prices equal marginal costs. Threats to switch suppliers set maximal fees. These also arise from a negotiation model that extends price competition. Competition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but consumer surpluses do not increase. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal aggregate welfare differs from the one that protects buyers most.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherTILEC
    Number of pages41
    Volume2012-041
    Publication statusPublished - 2012

    Publication series

    NameTILEC Discussion Paper
    Volume2012-041

    Fingerprint

    Bilateral oligopoly
    Market power
    Fees
    Marginal cost
    Price competition
    Buyers
    Suppliers
    Threat
    Negotiation model
    Bilateral
    Consumer surplus

    Keywords

    • Assignment Games
    • Infrastructure
    • Negotiations
    • Non-linear pricing
    • Market Power

    Cite this

    Funaki, Y., Houba, H. E. D., & Motchenkova, E. (2012). Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-041). Tilburg: TILEC.
    Funaki, Y. ; Houba, H.E.D. ; Motchenkova, E. / Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure. Tilburg : TILEC, 2012. (TILEC Discussion Paper).
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    Funaki, Y, Houba, HED & Motchenkova, E 2012 'Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2012-041, TILEC, Tilburg.

    Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure. / Funaki, Y.; Houba, H.E.D.; Motchenkova, E.

    Tilburg : TILEC, 2012. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-041).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    AB - Abstract: We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare. Prices equal marginal costs. Threats to switch suppliers set maximal fees. These also arise from a negotiation model that extends price competition. Competition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but consumer surpluses do not increase. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal aggregate welfare differs from the one that protects buyers most.

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    Funaki Y, Houba HED, Motchenkova E. Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure. Tilburg: TILEC. 2012. (TILEC Discussion Paper).