@techreport{d17939ae28824f338695d41070e2bca7,
title = "Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs",
abstract = "For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.",
keywords = "Cartel, Antitrust Policy, Antitrust Law, Leniency Program, Self-reporting, re-peated game",
author = "H.E.D. Houba and E. Motchenkova and Q. Wen",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
volume = "2008-046",
series = "TILEC Discussion Paper",
publisher = "TILEC",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "TILEC",
}