Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs

H.E.D. Houba, E. Motchenkova, Q. Wen

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output


For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles the effects of traditional antitrust regulation and the leniency program. Ex-ante leniency programs are effective if and only if these offer substantial rewards to the self-reporting firm. This is in contrast to currently employed programs that are therefore ineffective.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper


  • Cartel
  • Antitrust Policy
  • Antitrust Law
  • Leniency Program
  • Self-reporting
  • re-peated game


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